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Leveraging Internet-98 Technology for Computer Healthcare Networks: to its Limits and
its Limitations
Abstract
To what extent can current Internet technology be leveraged to fulfill the vision of the electronic
patient record (EPR) as a multimedia object and the healthcare information system as a secure
distributed computing network?  We explore provision of reliable, secure, intuitive, and
inexpensive medical Intranets through simple scripting and configuration – avoiding the need for
large programming teams. By prototyping the EPR as a secure newsgroup we demonstrate the
feasibility of a basic workflow system that: preserves a signed-paper style visibility of patient
data at all times; enriches presentation with multimedia online image exam viewing and user
controlled animation; whilst protecting confidential patient data via encrypted data
transmission, digital signatures, and authenticated user-access control.  In the process several
limitation of this technology are uncovered.
Introduction
A controversial aspect of the rise of the Internet and its technology has been the potential to use
essentially free software to enable information exchange between remotely cooperating
professionals.  Surely it has to be unsafe to trust such software particularly in the healthcare sector
where patients’ lives can be at stake. However, the traditional proprietary client/server systems can
be so expensive to commission whilst still remaining fairly low-tech [IOM 1996], or lacking
clinical functionality [Keen 1998] it may be worth considering how Internet technology might
actually be leveraged. To succeed it needs to satisfy stringent security concerns  [Anderson 96,
Clayton 1998]  and integrate visualization of medical image exams.  We share the vision of the
electronic patient record (EPR) as a multimedia object and the healthcare information system as a
secure distributed computing network [Sacoor 1997].
A defining feature of the Internet is that it runs on free software (e.g. the Apache web server)
without which most of the Web would not exist. Computer software has always has always been
crafted by talented people outside of commercial imperatives (witness: Perl, GNU, and Linux). 
Public domain software is now recognized of having a pedigree of its own and has often been more
rigorously tested than anything produced by commercial software houses. In place of the usual 
“babble” of incompatible proprietary formats (e.g. MS Word 6 & 7) open standards are adopted. 
These are often the fruits of independent bodies (e.g. HTML; HTTP; CGI) such as the W3C
consortium guided by long term interests for forward and backward compatibility. The public
domain also delivered the first leading Internet browser Mosaic. The Internet browser is a
remarkable variation of the trend – for three years it has been developed by commercial teams (first
at Netscape then also at Microsoft) to be “given away” as loss-leaders to the public.  The browser
war is about establishing control over the future direction of the Internet and thus its auxiliary
market – not selling browsers.  The ensuing competitive development has carried the original basic
browser through an accelerated evolution so that now both Netscape and Microsoft’s current
version 4 browsers deliver a remarkably sophisticated set of similar features at no cost. This
evolution has spawned two new open standards that may stimulate serious applications in such
domains as medical information systems, namely: the client-side JavaScript (CSJS) scripting
language and the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) protocol.
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The main auxiliary markets is that of the Intranet: a private internet built inside an institution or
enterprises that can provide an inexpensive, alternative to traditional distributed network
applications (client server database access). Families of servers have been developed Intranets
expanding the functionality of existing public domain servers and allowing a tighter degree of
integration and management. At issue here is the evaluation of this technology’s potential for direct
transplantation into distributed healthcare communications.  We need to distinguish whether it is
capable of providing more than a mere powerful but semi-reliable toy for surfing the web.  Can it
be integrated to render medical intranets that do useful tasks reliably, securely, efficiently and
inexpensively? How much of this can be achieved:

 Using simple configuration and scripting;

 Without having to resource and maintain an army of programmers;

 Without entirely re-equipping the existing computer-base of an institution;

 Without being subverted into proprietary (lock-in) technology of the browser providers?
We may appear to be tying our hands unnecessarily behind our back by refusing to program, but
whatever can be achieved in this manner should be particularly applicable in less-favored regions
where IT professional “hands” are often a scarce resource, and where next-generation Internet
may not arrive for some time to come. This approach complements a current trend towards the
deployment of cross-platform, object oriented, distributed computing such as the Telemed project
at Los Alamos where having demonstrated some capabilities of previous browsers to convey
virtual patient records  [TeleMed 96] – work has now moved on to implementations via Java
programming and CORBA interfacing.  Although that approach can have benefits it does tend to
impose delays while clients wait to download the Java bytecode necessary to run the applications. 
This is particularly frustrating if an installed browser already contains identical functionality (e.g.
form-based requests, or basic image viewing).  Moreover, alternatives to Java/CORBA middleware
can require a lot of code to gain similar cross platform status (e.g. the HANSA project [Blobel and
Holena 1997] took two million lines of code to define a Distributed Healthcare Environment API
that runs on both Unix and Win NT). A clear case can be made for a component-based system
architecture that allows intelligent use of small subsets of the whole information system without
needing access to all of its parts [Rosenberg 1997].  We intend to harness existing browser
components (e.g. readers, mailers, security modules, etc), whereas Java developers must re-
implement these and may adopt the emerging component architectures of JavaBeans [Sun 1998] or
CORBA-3 [OMG 1998]. Software components ideally should map on to system sub-units that,
like black boxes, satisfy, whenever possible, discrete element of the system’s functionality without
needing general connectivity to the rest of it.   Establishing key components early on leveraging
browser parts, should have several benefits:

 The human computer interface retains an essential degree of familiarity and transparency. The
user may already know and predict the behavior of the user interface components – and so may
feel ready to confirm important decisions digitally.

 To achieve functionality beyond the capabilities of the browser a roadmap already exists to
implement platform neutral, distributed components using Java/CORBA [Orfali and Harkey
1997].

 System design can be achieved incrementally by upgrading components.  Work on any one
component might proceed fairly independently – easing any development.
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The goal of software re-use has driven a trend towards object-oriented cross-platform components.
Whenever previously developed software can be re-used without going back to the program code
system development ought to accelerate [Brooks 1995].  Healthcare institutes that successfully
adopt the components within Internet browsers and Intranet servers would demonstrate exemplary
re-use.
Extending the paper metaphor: Patient record as secure newsgroup
For text-based reporting, computer interfaces that mimic paper forms have proven intuitive and
have remained popular ever since their early days on dumb-terminals connected to an SQL
database (DB).  The mundane interactive text field that can be filled-in and modified now
constitutes part of the furniture of the human computer interface.  The Internet has extended the
paper-form metaphor into the realm of remotely accessible, platform-independent, multimedia
presentations. The WMED system [Brelstaff and Loddo 1996] demonstrated this aspect by
augmenting medical images with clinical text extracted from a relational DB.  Its web server ran a
CGI script written in Perl that linked to images, made SQL queries then formatted the replies into
HTML.  CGI – the Common Gateway Interface - remains the main workhorse for serving DB
content across the web (despite the advent of superior programming technology: e.g. JDBC, WAI,
Apache-ModPerl). Unfortunately however,  most data entry methods drop the intuitive paper
metaphor as soon as a form gets submitted. Transparency is immediately lost –medics neither
know where the data has gone nor whether it was manipulated during the process to misrepresent
them.  With a paper form they would fill it in sign it and make a photocopy for their files before
dispatching it.  That corresponds much more to sending a digitally signed email than a CGI form. 
In fact, addressing the email to a secure newsgroup allows a digital photocopy to become rapidly
available to all who need to consult or update it.  A single news host could contain a newsgroup for
each patient in a hospital department so as to implement a collection of EPRs. For each patient the
corresponding newsgroup (see Fig. 1.) could contain a pre-specified set of threads that map on to
each distinct section in a paper patient record (e.g. identity data: generality, clinical plan,
diagnoses, vital signs, etc).  Each of these threads would be initialized with a blank form
appropriate to that section.  As the patient progresses within the department medics would
successively access and update the latest version of the form.  Thus a temporal audit of the state of
the form gets seamlessly compiled and becomes non-reputable whenever  medics digitally sign their
submission.
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Figure 1: Implementing an electronic patient record as a secure news group.  Here patient
0101’s generality is visible as an HTML page digitally signed by the medic who wrote it.
This represents a primitive variety of a medical workflow system. A workflow system typically
tracks the flux of digital documents around pre-specified paths in an enterprise (c.f. Lotus Notes).
Ours could promote asynchronous communications between medics - which evidence suggests can
often be more effective than direct means [Coiera and Tombs 1998]. For example, a radiologist
may need to be alerted that a request has arrived for an examination.  He may then schedule that
request for a certain date and post a reply. After the exam takes place he would then follow-up
with the submission of his report.  This is feasible using the pre-structured newsgroup of
successively refined forms as outlined above.  Workflow more usually directs messages to personal
mailboxes.  There the radiologist would check his email for new requests for work.  To maintain
network-wide visibility of the work queue the email would need to reside on a central mail server. 
A secure IMAP4 mail server (not POP3) might serve that need. IMAP4 and secure news protocols,
in fact, share many similarities [Udell 1998]. However, an IMAP4 server is really designed for
private (not group) reading – so imposing a structured grouping and threading with IMAP4 is less
stable than with a newsgroup.  Note, however, newsgroups do not implement transaction
management (TM) so unlike commercial medical workflow systems (e.g. [Schmidt 1997]) it is
difficult to prevent two medics simultaneously compiling the same form.  Nevertheless, it is
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interesting to illustrate what can be done without TM, while bypassing venerable formal message
passing protocols such as EDIFACT [UN 1998] or HL7 [HL7 1996].  To do this, some technical
details remain to be resolved:

 How can form data be mailed and still stay like paper?

 How can a mailed form be signed?

 How can patient confidentiality be maintained?

 How can medical images be furnished to the browser?

 What Intranet components are required?
These issues are addressed in turn in the remainder of this paper.
How can forms be mailed – and still stay like paper?
Sending an HTML form by email is more tricky than posting its data to a CGI program.  This is
because the data filling in the form’s blanks is transient in nature as it does not constitute part of
the page’s HTML description.  Naively filling in a form then using the browser’s Send Page
facility to launch the mail program with that page pre-attached just results in a blank form getting
mailed.  Somehow, the form’s data needs to be fused into its HTML before the mailer gets
launched.  Fortunately, this can be achieved using CSJS.  CCJS allows you to access the data in
the form and then overwrite the HTML on the page (a primitive but stable form of dynamic-
HTML) to reflect the data in a permanent manner.  Thus a frozen version of the form can be
written with an identical layout to the original – but with no longer any means of interactively
modifying data.   Syntactic care is required to correctly transpose each of HTML’s various form
elements (text, textarea, checkbox,  select, button, etc) into its corresponding fixed text version. 
The process of freezing the form can be initiated in response to the click of the form’s Commit
button.  This button is not present in the frozen version, but is transposed into a means of re-
activating the form. Reactivation may be applied immediately by the medic to make a correction
before mailing, or else it may be made by anyone responding to the message in the newsgroup – see
Fig. 2.
To achieve a robust reactivation mechanism in the frozen form we inserted a hypertext link labeled
Activate Form.  This link when clicked calls the HTML page of the original blank form with a
search string attached at the end of the URL containing all the data that was frozen in the form. 
Thus the original blank form has to contain additional CSJS to enable it to parse the data in the
search string (like a CGI program does) and then to enter that data as values in the appropriate
form fields.  In effect, we are using a re-entrant script that has two states:
Leveraging Internet-89 Technology for Computer Healthcare Networks 6
Figure 2: The form previously submitted to patient 0101’s generality section is stored in the
newsgroup as a frozen HTML page, but it can be re-activated by anyone authorized to read it by
simply clicking on the Activate Form link. The resultant form (raised) can then be resubmitted
once updated by clicking on the Commit button. Furthermore, imaging exams can be viewed as
pop-up windows (e.g. Fig. 4 ) by clicking the named buttons.

 Frozen  when in stored in the newsgroup, and visible in the news reader.

 Active once launched into the browser – by clicking Activate Form in the news reader.

 Frozen (again) in the browser – having clicked on the Commit button.
In the latter case the page is ready to e-mail to the newsgroup from where a subsequent work cycle
can begin.  It would be ill-advised to leave the process of addressing the email to the medic – any
mistake may send confidential data to a random recipient!  For this reason, the CSJS function that
handles the clicking of the Commit button carries out a second task. It launches the mailer with the
address, and subject of the message pre-specified - corresponding to the patient (newsgroup) and
the section (news-thread).
This is achieved by co-calling a link specified according to the mailto: protocol. The mechanism by
which the page gets attached is somewhat dependent on the browser type and version. The ideal
browser appears to be Netscape 4 running on Unix or a Mac where the entire page can be
prewritten as HTML directly into the message of the mailer merely by specifying the
&body=myHTML field of the mailto: protocol.  Testing for Internet Explorer 4 has been
confounded by mailto configuration problems.  However, Netscape 3 and 4 on Windows require
the user to learn three or four fairly precise mouse clicks that navigate the attachment dialog and
drop in the URL listed under the Page Info window.
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How can a mailed form be signed?
Public key (PK) cryptography permits the signing of digital messages.  The infrastructure
necessary to sign and verify messages is built-in to Netscape 4.  This infrastructure comprises both
the handling of digital certificates containing the necessary keys and the module required to
implement the S/MIME protocol [RSA 1996].  As Fig. 3 shows, each participant must be assigned
a private (secret to them) and public key. Something encrypted with the private key can only be
decrypted with the public key and vice-versa.  Signing a message involves deriving a message
digest (MD) from the private key and the message contents. Anyone possessing the public key can
reverse the cryptographic process to verify the message. The private key acts as secret token that
vouches for the individual’s identity and the MD indicates that the message has not suffered
tampering.  (Note, that since Netscape 4.04 it has also become possible to sign text and CGI forms
- but not HTML - using the same certificates and keys.)
Figure 3: An illustration of how the S/MIME secure email protocol allows emails to be digitally
signed, and also encrypted when appropriate.
How can patient confidentiality be maintained?
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To prevent breaches of patient confidentiality all data ought to be cryptographically protected
where ever it travels:

 On the newsgroup server

 In transmission between client and server

 On the client computer.
Ideally, end-to-end encryption would solve this entire problem: the data would be encrypted by the
mailer of the submitting medic and would remain so up to the point the next medic’s news reader
decrypts it and makes it temporarily visible.  As Fig. 3 indicates S/MIME can also provide end-to-
end encryption, and it is available in Netscape 4 when the right certificates are in place.
Unfortunately it is currently unsuited to communal group readership because each encryption is
destined for only one recipient – the one with the matching private key. Although it might be
theoretically possible to distribute the same private key to all participants of the newsgroup, that
would currently effectively render them as the same digital identity and so would make nonsense of
any digital signatures.  This will remain the case until the arrival of separate signing and
encryption keys within browsers [Elgamal and Cotter 1998].
Until then, a partial solution is to implement a secure newsgroup that encrypts all data in
transmission between client and the newsgroup and vice-versa. Netscape’s Collabra News Server
achieves this using the standard SSL protocol.  Previously, SSL has been used to ensure a secure
web server  [Hirsch 1997] such as the WMED system. For news or mail servers the technology is
identical: a temporary secret session key (not PK) is transmitted to the client by a preliminary PK
negotiation that establishes then authenticates the identity of the server and also the client when
required. That session key is then used to encrypt and decrypt (e.g. via DES) the data at client and
server (at full strength in Europe via Fortify [McKay 98]).  In this case, physical access to the
computer containing the newsgroup should be restricted as the data stored there is unencrypted.
 Similarly measures need to be in place to prevent the medic leaving confidential files on the client
computer. In general, client-side security must make a compromise that allows the medic to export
some confidential data to disk or printer (i.e. trust them) whilst at the same time supporting then
from unintentionally disclosing information to subsequent users of their computer (i.e. retaining
their trust). For the latter case, some partial solutions do currently exist:

 Time-outs can be specified – so that an HTML form (containing sensitive information) that has
not been submitted after, say, three minutes is replaced on the browser window by a blank
page.

 No-cache directives can tell the browser not to cache an HTML form for future access.
Nevertheless, such directives cannot prevent CSJS from writing to the browser’s memory-
cache (as our freezing a form does).  Reaccessing an old copy of a form through use of the
back button might be avoided by implementing extra CSJS mechanisms.

 Browser configuration could prevent a history list (of the pages accessed by the medic) being
left for others to read.  This configuration is best done using a browser customized so that user
cannot manually reverse it [Netscape 1998].

 Closing the browser after use forces the next user to adopt their own personal digital id – not
that of the previous medic.  This policy may prove difficult to maintain – as medics may have
to leave the browser at a moment’s notice during clinical emergencies.
Thus, client-side security remains somewhat patchy in today’s browser-based systems.
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Getting medics to trust a system also depends on the veracity of the software. Our CSJS script take
care not to contravene any browser sandbox security model so we have no need to incur the
bureaucratic confusion involved digitally signing JavaScripts.  It is enough to serve scripts from a
certificated SSL server so that the medic always has resort to check the originators identity if ever
in doubt.
How can medical images be furnished to the browser?
Images that can be included on an HTML pages are generally of inferior quality than those which
radiologist see on their clinical workstations. The JPEG and GIF formats are restricted to 8-bit
pixels and so do not support extreme contrast stretching that radiologist might like to apply to see
the particular detail that they are looking for.  Nevertheless, for some purposes they have been
acceptable [Johnson et al 1998].
Problems arise when you try to provide  full radiological image quality over the web. First, you
must provide the software that allows this imagery to be viewed and manipulated (e.g. OSIRIS
[Ligier 94]) as a helper application, or else a plugIn or Java applet [Bayo 1997] of similar
functionality. Second, you must contend with larger data volumes imposing longer download times:
 Either you lease a fast line or you can consider compressing the image data.  Image compression is
still rather suspected by radiologists so we  aim to adopt a pragmatic approach that gives an simple
set of choices to the medic that determine how the 12- or 16- bit data on the server should be
contrast-ranged into the available bit range of a GIF image. Animation control can also be
provided for a sequence of images (e.g. TTE). For example, the medic might prefer to first view,
say, every fifth frame in the sequence (rapidly) before choosing to download the rest. The server
does the work of the ranging from DICOM to GIF format in organized collections of frames.  For
this we are exploring a CGI interface into the CTN public domain DICOM PACS software
[Moore 1994]. The role of CSJS on the browser is to mediate the request of ranging and sampling
parameters and provide controlled animation. The medic may stop, restart, reverse, step-through
and alter the animation so this surpasses GIF-89 technology. In practice, the smooth running of the
animation requires the whole selection of frames to be downloaded into the browser’s memory-
cache.  Only then is execution not interrupted by re-accessing data from the image server.  Fig. 4
provides a snapshot of our cross-browser implementation. 
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Figure 4: A medical image viewer with fairly comprehensive animation control can be
implemented using client-side JavaScript. Contrast ranging however must be done on the image
server.
Achieving other means of image compression (e.g. fractals or PNG) are not feasible in CSJS
because it has no methods to process image pixels. Furthermore, serving images beyond the
confines of a CGI interface appears suited to a CORBA PACS interface [Loddo 1997].
What Intranet components are required?
Our prototype EPR newsgroup has been  implemented as a small Intranet illustrated in Fig. 5 the
main operational components are:
1. A secure news server (Netscape Collabra) running SSL, and restricting access to only those
users registered to use it.  Access control is be either by verified PK certificate or by
username/password.
2. A secure web server (Netscape Enterprise 3.5) running SSL using an identical access control
procedure.   It is used to serve: the re-activated CSJS-enabled forms, images via a CGI/CTN
cache interface, and other pages such as on-line help, etc.
3. A directory server (Netscape DS 3.5) that provides a centralized user database storing all the
information that the other servers need to control access and verify digital ids. It is also
available to the browser (Netscape 4)  to find the email addresses and PK certificates of the
other users of the system.
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As Fig. 5 shows administration (and installation) of all these servers is centrally controlled by an
additional web server (SuiteSpot).  Furthermore, we were able to manufacture all users certificates
under our own certificate authority using a dedicated certificate server (Netscape 1.01).
Two aspects dictated our choice of Netscape servers: they are available for Unix not just WinNT
and they are designed with extreme scalability in mind. Although, there was minimal technical
support, we were able to evaluate the full products at no cost.
Note from Fig. 5, no relational DB is needed – the newsgroup itself  constitutes the data archive. It
may be useful, however, at least during a system migration phase or for other views such as data
warehousing, to mirror each newsgroup update to an existing legacy database.  This might be
achieved simply by spawning an additional response to the Commit action that posts to the DB via
a CGI program.
Figure 5: An integrated infrastructure for digital identity such as that provided the LDAP
directory service in Netscape family of servers can unify access control and digital signature
verification across the news server, the browser, as well a web server used to serve images or CS
JavaScript enabled forms.
Conclusions
By prototyping the EPR as a secure newsgroup we have attempted to take current browser
scripting to its limit. In the process we have been able to demonstrate a surprising degree of
feasibility including:
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
 The basics of a workflow system that preserves a paper-style visibility of patient data at all
times.

 Multimedia EPR presentation enriched by online image exam viewing with controlled
animation.

 Protection of confidential patient data via encrypted data transmission, centrally administered
user-access control, and attributable data
Several limitations have been uncovered including:

 The current lack of end-to-end encryption for group reading.

 The lack of built-in transaction management of the kind a relational DB traditionally provides.

 Any image enhancement still must be applied on the server as the browser cannot access
individual image pixels.

 Similarly, browsers currently do not support vector graphics so ergonomic rendering of
annotated overlays of image exams is practically  impossible.
However, some of these limitations may be removed through the continuing activities of :

 the browser producers to extend functionality.

 researchers carrying out broader range projects on the EPR (e.g. PROREC [Redondo 1998])
and on trustworthy health telematics (e.g. TRUSTHEALTH [Klein 1998]).

 the W3C to steward new open standards.

 medical informatics bodies working towards refined standardization e.g.: CEN/TC/251,
ACR/NEMA, and CORBAmed.
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